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FLORIDA AND THE
CUBAN REVOLUTION, 1895-1898
by W ILLIAM J. S CHELLINGS

T

HE CUBAN REVOLT against Spanish rule in 1895 and the
possibility that this might lead to war between Spain and the
United States placed Florida in a dilemma. There were a number
of reasons for the state’s rejoicing at the prospect of Cuban independence, and for many individual Floridians to want to aid the
rebels. Against this, however, was the fear that if the United
States went to war against Spain it could end only in disaster for
Florida. As a result, an attempt was made to walk a middle path,
to encourage the giving of private aid to the rebels, and yet to
strongly oppose any official action that might lead to intervention and war. During this period, Florida presented the unique
picture of being the only state in which all important newspapers
were united in opposition to war. 1 The journals continued to
oppose it right up to the day on which President McKinley signed
the joint resolution of Congress that, in effect, placed the country in a state of war. Then and only then did the press of Florida capitulate and begin to display any enthusiasm for war.
While the Spanish American War has recently been termed
a “popular crusade,“ 2 presumably with William Randolph Hearst
and Joseph Pulitzer acting the parts of Pope Urban II and Peter
the Hermit, it can be seen that if it was a crusade, Florida was
certainly a last minute recruit.
In opposing the war, the editors were concerned with the
danger of possible attack by the Spanish fleet, and with compensation for the losses they feared would come as a result of the
war. In these matters Florida was not alone. Every city and state
on the Gulf and Atlantic coasts feared attack, and a number of
other states sought to gain some material benefit from the prospective war.

1. The following newspapers were examined for the period under consideration: the Jacksonville Times Union and Citizen, the Tampa
Tribune, the Tampa Times, the Ocala Banner, the Ft. Myers Press,
the Miami Metropolis, the Pensacola Daily News, and the Pensacola
Daily Journal. Scattered issues of other papers were also scanned.
2. Frank Freidel, The Splendid Little War (New York, 1958), p. 3.
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The attitude of the state towards the Cuban revolution as
here depicted from the leading newspapers in Florida may not
reflect the opinion of all Floridians, but it was undoubtedly the
opinion and attitude of a large and influential group in the state,
the business interests. In the 1890’s especially, the newspapers
of the entire state, while showing occasional political enmity
toward each other, did present a united front in all matters
economic. They read almost like the broadsides of an optimistic
Chamber of Commerce for Florida. On the subjects of business,
industry, tourism, agriculture, etc., editors became eloquent over
the future prospects for the state, picturing a Florida that would
soon be one of the leading centers of industry, an area where
wealth and population would grow more rapidly than in any other
state. While there was no Henry Grady in Florida, each editor
probably imagined himself to be a second Grady, and his paper
a second Atlanta Constitution. Differing politically at times, the
papers were as one in economic matters, and in their handling
of the Cuban question.
In fact, it was this very concentration on the future economic
welfare of the state that occasioned a fear of any type of American
intervention that might lead to war. The editors represented a
group which saw in war an interruption of business, a halt in expansion and growth, and the seeds of virtual ruin in a struggle
between the United States and Spain. In their minds, war meant
victory, victory meant the annexation of Cuba, and a Cuba within
the tariff walls of the United States meant competition that could
not be met.
In spite of the threat to business from a war with Spain, Floridians had enough common interests with the Cubans to make
them favor Cuban independence. Historically, the two shared a
common past of Spanish rule. Geographically, the proximity of
Cuba to the mainland made Florida seem a second home to many
Cubans, who found it easier for themselves to reach the Keys than
it was for many Floridians. Too, the climate is similar, and many
of the same crops could be raised on both the island and the
peninsula.
Economically, apart from agriculture, Florida in normal times
enjoyed good trade relations with Cuba. In return for cattle, fish,
and timber, the state imported large quantities of Cuban tobacco.
Tampa alone received more Havana leaf than any other American
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city except New York. It was confidently expected that this trade
would expand tremendously if the island became independent.
Finally, close ties with Cuba were ensured by the presence in
Florida of some eight thousand Cubans. These people were almost all living in Tampa and Key West, and formed the bulk of
the labor for the cigar industry. That industry, paying wages annually in the neighborhood of $3,000,000, and producing nearly
$10,000,000 worth of cigars, was one of the largest and most
important in the state. 3
The effort of the newspapers to steer a middle course, to
avoid war and yet give no impression of supporting Spain, clearly
did place local interests above what many regarded as national
interests. But those local interests were, in their eyes, the paramount issues for Florida. Convinced as they were of the results
of a war for the state, it is hard to see how they could have acted
otherwise.
When Florida first heard about the revolt, on February 25,
1895, the Cubans in Tampa and Key West were probably the
only ones to give the event much attention. In Tampa, a thousand
Cubans danced in the streets to celebrate, but elsewhere, apart
from noting the outbreak, few paid it much heed. The state was
just beginning to recover from the effects of the terrible freeze of
that winter and was still adding up the estimated losses of from
fifty to seventy-five million dollars. Citrus groves throughout the
northern and central part of the state had been destroyed, and the
future appeared bleak indeed for many thousands of Floridians. 4
With its perennial optimism, the state began a remarkable
recovery. Henry Flagler pushed his railroad down the east coast.
A city sprang up at the southern end of the rails, quickly adopting
the ways that have marked Miami since then. New lands were
opened for development, both for citrus fruits and truck farming.
New towns appeared, with full facilities for tourists, on both the
east and west coasts. The census of 1900 was to show that population had continued its rate of increase. The state had counted
391,422 citizens in 1890, and it added 137,122 more in the
3. Twelfth Census of the United States, 1900 (Washington, 1902),
Vol. VIII, Mfg., pt. 2, p. 124.
4. J. E. Dovell, Florida, Historic, Dramatic, Contemporary (New York,
1952), p. 631.
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next ten years. 5 The continued growth and development of the
state seemed assured, and all attention was concentrated on it.
The only cloud on the horizon was the Cuban revolution, and
the increasingly warlike attitude of some of the newspapers to
the north.
It became impossible to ignore the revolt, especially with the
Cuban junta in full operation. Reorganized by Jose Marti and
Tomas Estrada Palma in 1891, the junta had established over
two hundred political clubs. Seventy-six of those clubs were in
Florida, all of them devoted to aiding the revolution. The junta
collected ten per cent of the wages of the cigar workers, and used
the money to finance the shipment of arms and ammunition to
the rebel forces. 6
Many Floridians participated in this activity, and profited
greatly thereby. Among others were the future governor of Florida,
Napoleon P. Broward, with his tug The Three Friends, and Captain “Dynamite” Johnny O’Brien with The Dauntless. Such filibustering expeditions were illegal, but many people cooperated in
aiding the ships to escape detection. Business firms as well as
venturesome individuals took part. Finlayson and Cottrell of Cedar
Key, Knight and Wall of Tampa, and others, were known to have
acted as purchasing agents or receiving agents for shipments of
arms for the Cuban rebels. 7 The revolutionary work of the junta
was so effective that the Spaniard, Captain General Salamanca
was reported to have exclaimed that if he could destroy the Cuban
centers of Tampa and Key West the rebel organization would
collapse. 8
Be that as it may, the junta did aid in keeping the revolution
on the front page of the newspapers. In addition to the sending
of arms to Cuba, the junta saw to it that a sufficient number of
stories designed to stimulate sympathy for the Cubans reached the
newspapers in all parts of the United States. Many of the stories
may well have been true, but there can be no doubt that many
also were manufactured, particularly in Key West. General
“Butcher” Weyler and his reconcentrado policy received perhaps
5. Twelfth Census, VoI. I, Population, pt. 1, p. lxxxii.
6. George M. Auxier, “Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Junta in
Precipitating the Spanish American War, 1895-1898,” Hispanic
American Historical Review, XIX (August 1939), 285-384.
7. Richard Vernon Rickenbach, “A History of Filibustering from Florida to Cuba, 1895-l898” (Unpublished Master’s thesis, University of
Florida, 1948), 53-55.
8. Fernando Ortiz, Cuban Counterpoint (New York, 1947) p. 88.
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more than his share of attention. His acts, and those of the Spanish
generally, were depicted as needlessly and deliberately cruel and
barbaric. While the Florida papers did not publish quite as many
of this type of story as appeared in the northern journals, some
were printed. They acted as stimulants for fund raising drives for
the relief of the reconcentrados, an activity that was nationwide.
In this Florida joined wholeheartedly and contributed her share.
In the north, the deluge of such tales of cruelty and barbarity
hastened the appearance of demands for intervention by the United States. No such demand emanated from any Florida newspaper. Instead, the editors condemned such acts as those charged
to the Spaniards. They expressed their sympathy, contributed to
funds for Cuban relief, and wished the rebels good luck in their
endeavors. One paper, however, went even further. The Tampa
Tribune, a journal owned in part by a group of Cuban cigar manufacturers, pointed out that cruelty and terror were used by both
the Spaniards and Cubans. 9 The paper showed no desire for direct
American intervention.
From the beginning of the revolt in February, 1895, until the
end of 1897, the Florida papers gave little heed to the HearstPulitzer demands for such intervention. Apart from occasionally
rebuking the northern journals for their jingoistic tendencies, the
peninsula editors apparently felt that there was little danger of any
such action. As long as Grover Cleveland remained in the White
House, they were correct. Cleveland was just as convinced as they
were that intervention was both unnecessary and undesirable. Although he offered to mediate between Spain and the rebels, and
used diplomatic pressure to try to secure a compromise, he gave
every indication of being firmly opposed to actual intervention by
the use of force. But when William McKinley was inaugurated as
President, an element of doubt appeared. The Republican platform
had contained a plank calling for the recognition of Cuban independence, and that was too close to intervention to suit the Floridians. However, even McKinley made it clear that he opposed the
use of anything other than the weapons of diplomacy, and as a
result he was applauded for his statesmanship.
In December, 1897, Spain finally promised what seemed to
be adequate concessions of self-government to offer at least a hope
9. Tampa Tribune, December 28, 1897.
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that the struggle could be ended. When McKinley announced the
concessions promised, he asked that all Americans and Cubans
grant the Spanish sufficient time to carry out their pledges, and at
the same time he again repudiated the idea of using force to aid
the Cubans. Again the Florida press applauded. The Jacksonville
Times Union and Citizen took the occasion to warn the Cubans
that if they were intent on full independence, they must not look
to the United States for aid, but must accomplish the task by
themselves. The editor wished them good luck, but no more. The
same idea was echoed in the other state papers.
In the ensuing months, the state press continued to allot adequate space to the revolt, but gave most of its attention to local
matters. In addition, there now began to appear a rather surprising
amount of news that represented the Spanish side of the story. The
Ocala Banner and the Tampa Tribune in particular were more impartial as far as the news stories were concerned than most other
newspapers. News about the revolt seemed to decrease, and even
filibuster activities were on the decline. Until February, 1898,
a peaceful settlement, or at least an end to the conflict without the
United States being involved, appeared possible.
In February, however, two events occurred that changed the
picture abruptly. The publication of the famous DeLome letter
and the sinking of the battleship U. S. S. Maine in the harbor at
Havana brought demands in the national press and in Congress
for war. The demands were expressed most forcefully and immediately by the New York Journal and the New York World, the
Hearst and Pulitzer papers respectively. The Journal charged that
the explosion that sank the Maine had been set off by the Spaniards deliberately, and it even published a diagram, an “artist’s
conception,” showing how the mine had been placed. 10
Compared to the warlike stand taken in that paper, the Florida
press was most conservative. It might be added that their stand
on both the DeLome letter and the Maine explosion was more
realistic than that of the northern papers. Instead of viewing the
DeLome letter as an unforgiveable insult, the Jacksonville Times
Union and Citizen, in common with other state papers, saw it as
a regrettable, somewhat stupid error, but one that should cause
no difficulty. As for the Maine, most of the Florida editors gave
10. New York Journal, February 17, 1898.
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the story full coverage, but cautioned their readers that no judgment should be passed until the Navy had made its investigation.
Several papers, including the Tampa Tribune, offered the
theory that the explosion had been an accident. The Tampa editor
also declared that if it had not been an accident, then he tended
to believe that the rebels were the ones to be suspected. His reasoning was plain. He realized that the destruction of the ship might
well cause the United States to take stronger steps, and that the
rebels were the only ones likely to benefit should those steps include war. 11
By the time the first excitement over the sinking had subsided,
signs began to appear that the editors were now becoming aware
that they were fighting a losing battle even among their own readers. On February 3 the Miami Metropolis commented on the prevalence of war talk in Key West, declaring that people in that
city were predicting war in sixty days. The following day the
Times Union and Citizen joined in, denouncing talk designed to
hasten war. Shortly afterward, the letters-to-the-editor column in
the Ocala Banner began to reflect the fact that many people in
Florida now believed war was both necessary and desirable. Soon
the editors themselves began to admit that war was probably going
to come, even though they still maintained their attitude of opposition to it.
With that admission, a subtle change took place in the news
and editorial columns. While continuing to denounce the jingoes,
the editors began casting about to see if there was some way in
which the state could benefit. Their speculations about the nature
of the war, and the observation of increased activity at Key West
gave them both a ray of hope and a new headache. Trainloads of
ammunition began to pass through Jacksonville, headed for Key
West via Tampa. While rejoicing in the additional railroad business, both the Jacksonville and the Tampa papers saw that the
greatest benefit would accrue to Key West. That sparked some
hope that the Navy would require another base to keep Key West
supplied, and claims for both Miami and Tampa were advanced,
with nothing more in mind at the moment than their service as
subsidiary supply bases.
The Florida East Coast Railroad, on the other hand, felt capable of handling the supply problem. J. P. Beckwith, Passenger
11. Tampa Tribune, February 17, 1898.
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Agent for the railroad, wired Secretary of War Alger on March
1, offering the service of his road. The telegram was published
in the Times Union and Citizen, and read as follows:
In the event of war should you need quick movement of
troops to Key West, the FEC Railway, from Jacksonville to
Miami, 367 miles, and the FEC Steamship Company, Miami
to Key West, 135 miles, are in a position to give 20 hours
time between Jacksonville and Key West and have equipment
to handle 3,000 troops daily and can add more if desired. 12
The wire was typical of the thinking that was to continue to
be evident for some time. Thoughts of the war concentrated on
the fact that it would be a naval war, and, if the Army entered
into it at all, it would be based on Key West. Not even in the
business-minded Jacksonville paper did any thought appear that
there might be other aspects of the military activity that would be
of advantage to Florida. Even after publishing the Beckwith telegram on March 2, the editor accompanied it with an article that
was gloomy in the extreme. Saying that activity that might be
helpful to the railroads would not compensate for the war, he outlined what he believed would happen. War would shut down the
lumber shipping trade; lumber mills and camps would have to
close; the tourist trade would halt; and the coastal cities would be
subject to attack by the Spanish fleet.
While the editor was obviously worried, and still detested the
thought of war, other Floridians saw more than a ray of hope. As
early as February 16, the Tampa Tribune let its guard down
momentarily, and proclaimed :
If Uncle Sam does decide to give Spain a slap in the face,
and does not thump the pumpkins out of her too soon, then
times in Tampa will certainly boom. Tom Weir and W. V.
Lifsey have already made arrangements to buy all the sweet
potatoes in South Florida, with expectations of making a fortune out of the speculation.
Such items tended to encourage some degree of optimism, but
not nearly enough to overcome the feeling that war would be
catastrophic for the state as a whole. By March 1, the probability
of war had become almost a certainty, and several editors began to
show concern over a naval war which might bring the Spanish
12. Times Union and Citizen (Jacksonville), March 2, 1898.
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Navy to Florida. Although in February the editor of the Jacksonville paper had ridiculed the request of the Army Engineers for
funds for the fortification of Washington, D. C., he now joined
in the swelling chorus of voices rising from all the east coast cities,
demanding that fortifications be built at once.
Most of the coastal cities joined the chorus. Only two, Key
West and Pensacola, had no worries on this score. Possessing naval
bases, their defenses were in better shape than most, and the
Army had already begun strengthening the batteries at each harbor. But the truth of the matter was simply that the Army did not
possess the guns, the money, or even the men that would be required to defend each city. Nor, for that matter, did it have the
time, Brigadier General John M. Wilson, Chief of Engineers,
covered the situation in a letter sent to Representative Stephen
Sparkman, referring to an inquiry about plans to defend Tampa.
He began by saying simply that the plans of the Army did not at
that time include any provision for Tampa. He then mentioned
the delays that would be encountered in such a project, touching
on the problems of land to be secured, plans to be drawn up, and
then the actual construction. He concluded by saying that these
were insuperable obstacles barring any defense of the city in the
emergency at hand. 13 Similar replies were sent in answer to inquiries from other Florida cities.
All during the month of March the cities bombarded Secretary
of War Alger with insistent demands for protection. Mayors,
chambers of commerce, congressmen, and many others sent off
letters and telegrams. All were met with the same polite answer,
but without any promise of action. Tampa was the first city to
receive any action on its request. Henry B. Plant, with the extensive Plant System yards and docks at Port Tampa, took a hand.
Three days after he personally wrote to Alger on March 22, Alger
ordered his Chief of Engineers to prepare plans for Tampa’s
defense. 14
The Florida East Coast Railroad sent J. B. Ingraham to Washington to try to get action for Jacksonville, but that city had to
wait until April 5, at which time a general plan was announced
by the War Department to provide batteries for a number of cities,
13. National Archives and Records Services, Selected Records Relating
to Tampa, Florida, 1896-1898 (Washington, 1 9 3 4 ) Items 1, 2, 3.
Microfilm.
14. Ibid., Items 4, 5.
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including Jacksonville, Fernandina, St. Augustine, and Miami.
Actual work was not to begin until after the President had sent
his message to Congress on April 11, and as a result not one of the
cities had any real protection until after the war was over. In the
meantime, worry had increased to the extent that several cities,
including Miami and a number of smaller communities on the
coast, raised and equiped troops of Home Guards for defense,
arming them with rifles secured from the state.
The last ten days before the war, the period in which Congress
was debating the Presidential message, was a rather mixed-up time
for the editors. Still holding on to their opposition to war, their
tone gradually mellowed as they noted more and more activity
taking place in Key West and in Pensacola. The constant stream
of trains loaded with guns and ammunition, the work on the
various defense works, and the prospect of at least an extended
stay of the Fleet, had cheered Key West tremendously, and some
of the excitement seeped into the other parts of Florida. Reports
of prosperous and happy merchants, the recruitment of labor for
the bases, and the vague sense of excitement may not have reconciled the editor of the Times Union and Citizen to the impending
war, but they did help to alleviate his pain and ease his mind. He
still continued to denounce the war, frequently observing somewhat acidly that enthusiasm for war increased the farther away
one went from the scene of action. As far as he was concerned,
no one in his right mind desired war.
The editor’s dislike for war is not hard to understand, but his
overlooking the one development that could and would bring great
economic benefit to the state is. As early as the middle of March it
had been announced that the War Department planned to concentrate all its available troops into several camps that were to be
located in the Southeast. With the knowledge, and the repeated
assertion of the fact that Florida was closest to Cuba, why did it
not occur to the editor, or to anyone else, that Florida might at
least secure one of the camps? As it was, no one took any more
note of the announcement than merely to publish it along with
other news. It required a news item in the New York Times of
March 30 to alert the state to the possibility.
On that day, the New York Times carried the news that a
conference had been held in Washington to determine the location
of the camps. No final decision had yet been made, but, according to the Times, four cities were being considered. These were
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New Orleans, Mobile, Tampa, and Savannah. It appeared that
the city to be chosen was to act as a base of supplies and a shipping base, as well as a camp for troops. All of the cities named
were ports fairly close to Cuba.
The Times item started a chain reaction in Florida. Tampa
in particular was galvanized into action to attempt to ensure its
being selected, and Jacksonville supported the claim of the West
coast city. The campaign waged by Tampa to secure the nomination cannot be detailed here, but it should be noted that the prospect opened up a vista of future possibilities that soon engaged
the attention of most of the towns and cities in the state. When
Tampa learned, on April 16, that it had won out over the other
cities on the list, the entire state rejoiced, with but a few snide remarks on the part of cities that thought their situation was better
than Tampa’s for the use of the Army.
However, even the rejoicing over the location of the base and
the camp did not lessen the regret still being expressed by most of
the editors. They would have perferred to see no war at all. The
Miami Metropolis again denounced the “loud-talking jingoists,”
declaring that the very ones who demanded war would remain
silent when it came time to volunteer. The editor of the Times
Union and Citizen, just prior to the war, on April 9, finally gave
a full explanation for his stand.
Convinced by then that nothing could avert war, and aware
of the benefits that might be secured, the editor still had no appetite for the prospect. He firmly believed that the end of the war
would see the annexation of Cuba, and it was this that underlay
his opposition. He foresaw Cuban competition in the areas of citrus fruit growing, truck farming, and sugar cane. He did not think
that the Florida growers could meet that competition, and he also
thought that with Cuba within the tariff walls, Florida would lose
its attraction for new developments and new settlers interested in
any of those lines. He predicted that the cigar manufacturers and
cigar workers of Tampa and Key West would return to Cuba. As
for the tourist trade, he predicted that within ten years Florida
would be only a way station on the road to Cuba.
He then turned to seek what cheer he could in the situation. The building of fortifications, plus the establishment of an
Army camp, would rebound to the benefit of Florida business, and
the editor believed that Jacksonville would share in the gain to be
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made. However, once more his pessimism took over, and he warned
that an upturn in business of that nature would be only temporary, and would be offset by losses in the lumber, phosphate, and
tourist industries. Other editors, while not speaking as plainly,
appeared to agree, and they still maintained a rather somber attitude until April 20.
On April 11, President McKinley sent to Congress a message
that, in effect, asked authorization for the use of the armed forces
in order to expel Spain. The House of Representatives agreed by
an overwhelming vote, and by April 16, the Senate also approved
a similar resolution. By April 20, the two houses had ironed out
some differences in wording, and the resolution was sent to McKinley. As soon as a copy of the resolution reached Florida, one
section caught the eyes of all newsmen, and the war could now be
seen in a different light.
That section was what is known as the Teller Amendment.
By this, the United States disclaimed any desire to add Cuba to
its possessions, and pledged the nation to leave the island’s future
government up to the Cubans. The sigh of relief that swept the
editorial offices was so deep that it might have been heard all over
Florida. The Jacksonville editor threw off any restraint and plunged into the task of promoting the war effort, and, incidentally,
promoting Florida for a more active part in that war. The editor
of the Tampa Times came right out and declared that the city was
now relieved of all fear for the future, that it could rest assured
that the cigar manufacturers would not return to Cuba. With that
off his chest, he too turned joyfully to the prospect of reaping
profits from the war. As he wrote, troops were already arriving in
the city, and merchants were already doing business with the
Army.
The material benefits to be secured by Florida would far exceed the expectations of anyone in the state, but great as they
were, they did not distract the editors from their self-imposed task
of trumpeting the advantages of the state far and wide and of
advertising their belief that Florida was destined to be one of the
truly great states of the Union. Before the summer was more than
half over, before the war was ended, the editors began to warn of
the need to prepare for the resumption of normal business, the
business of building a greater, more populous, and more prosperous state. The press of Florida had thus early anticipated the
Chamber of Commerce in its converted promotional efforts.
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